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Abstract
In this paper we investigate whether race and ethnicity inuenced subprime loan
pricing during 2005, the peak of the subprime mortgage expansion. We combine loan-
level data on the performance of non-prime securitized mortgages with individual- and
neighborhood-level data on racial and ethnic characteristics for metropolitan areas in
California and Florida.
Using a model of rate determination that accounts for predicted loan performance,
we evaluate the presence of disparate impact and disparate treatment from race and
ethnicity on rate-setting behavior across the most popular subprime mortgage products.
In contrast with previous studies of the subprime market, we nd evidence of adverse
pricing eects for black and Hispanic borrowers.
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1 Introduction
A long literature examines the role of income and race on consumer lending. Most of this
literature focuses on whether racial minorities are denied credit more frequently than white
households with similar observable credit characteristics and on whether lenders deny credit
to residents of neighborhoods with a high proportion of minorities (a practice called redlin-
ing).
Research on mortgages that originated prior to 1995, when mortgages were usually un-
derwritten manually, found strong evidence that lenders were denying credit more frequently
to black households than to white households with similar observable characteristics.1 Fi-
nancial and technological innovation in underwriting processes have made risk-based pricing
of credit, rather than mere credit allocation, a more relevant issue in recent years. This is
especially true in the subprime market where lenders were much less likely to sell the loan
to government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and
were thus less constrained by rm cutos on variables such as loan-to-value ratios, loan size,
and credit scores. In a world where lenders cope with credit risk by rationing credit, dis-
crimination and redlining manifest themselves primarily in loan denials. In contrast, when
borrowers choose amongst several dierent sets of loan terms, each with a dierent price,
minorities may be more able to obtain credit but may pay a higher price for it. Indeed, and
perhaps in response to more stringent allocation constraints in prime mortgage markets, a
disproportionate share of subprime loans went to black and Hispanic households (Mayer and
Pence, 2008).
In this paper, we examine the inuence of race and ethnicity on subprime loan pricing
during 2005. Our study is most closely related to that of Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy
(2009). They matched data on loan pricing and risk measures with data on borrowers' race
and racial composition of neighborhoods to analyze so-called 2/28 mortgages during August
1The seminal study is Munnell, Browne, McEneaney, and Tootell (1996). Ross and Yinger (2002) provide
a comprehensive overview and analysis of the literature surrounding that study; see also Ladd (1998).
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of 2005 for the entire United States.
Although we use a similar procedure to obtain the matched loan data, our analysis diers
from theirs in many respects. First, we focus our analysis on California and Florida, two
of the states with the highest incidence of subprime mortgages, and we extend the analysis
to all of 2005 and across 8 dierent mortgage product categories. More importantly, we
evaluate the presence of discrimination in loan pricing by analyzing the eect of race and
neighborhood characteristics both on (1) the lenders' assessment of borrowers' risk proles
in an actuarial stage and (2) on the interest rate determination in an underwriting stage.
Haughwout et al. do not consider that lenders' forecasts of loan performance are used
in the underwriting process and that these forecasts may be correlated with race. Also,
while their approach only allows them to evaluate disparate treatment discrimination, our
methodology allows us to distinguish between disparate treatment and more subtle forms of
discrimination. For example, as suggested by Ross and Tootell (2004), lenders may require
black and Hispanic borrowers to purchase private mortgage insurance when they would not
require a white borrower with a similar risk prole to do so.
As in Haughwout et al. (2009), we nd no evidence of adverse loan pricing from race and
ethnicity in 2/28 mortgages|although we nd that lower-income neighborhoods face higher
interest rates for this mortgage product, which suggests redlining. In contrast, we nd that
race and ethnicity had an adverse eect on loan pricing in various other mortgage products,
resulting in increases in interest rates for blacks and Hispanics ranging from 5 to 35 basis
points. Specically, we nd that Hispanics face higher interest rates in 5 of the 8 mortgage
categories we analyzed, while blacks face higher interest rates in 3 mortgage categories. We
also nd evidence of redlining in 7 mortgage categories. Finally, we nd that for blacks and
Hispanics, purchasing private mortgage insurance and facing prepayment penalties seem to
be associated with obtaining lower interest rates in some mortgage categories.
Additional recent papers that examine the eect of race on consumer credit include
Woodward (2008), Reid and Laderman (2009), Pope and Sydnor (2008), and Ravina (2008).
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Woodward (2008) examines closing costs and nds that they are higher for minorities and
households with less education. Reid and Laderman (2009) study the link between race
and ethnicity and the likelihood of obtaining higher priced loans in California. Pope and
Sydnor (2008) and Ravina (2008) analyze the peer-to-peer lending market and nd evidence
of higher loan pricing for black borrowers when compared with white borrowers with similar
risk proles.
In the next section we describe the data and summarize the matching algorithm. In sec-
tion 3 we present the model of rate determination and describe the estimation methodology.
We present our results in section 4 and provide concluding remarks in section 5.
2 Data
Our data are non-prime, securitized, rst-lien mortgages originated in 2005 in California
and Florida. We merge detailed data on the performance and terms of the loans from First
American LoanPerformance (LP) with data on borrower income, borrower race, Census tract
income, and Census tract racial composition obtained under the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA). To match loans from LP with HMDA data, we use a matching algorithm
similar to that of Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy (2009).
2.1 Matching LP data with HMDA data
The matching procedure considers rst-lien loans with the same purpose (purchase or re-
nance) and occupancy status (owner-occupied). LP associates each loan with a 5-digit ZIP
code, while HMDA loans are associated with Census tracts. To match ZIP codes with Cen-
sus tracts we used Census ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs).2 We also use GIS software
to establish Census tracts search areas associated with any given ZCTAs as follows: for each
loan in LP we determined the smallest set of Census tracts that intersect with the associated
2ZCTAs are statistical entities developed by the Census for tabulating summary statistics from the 2000
Census for geographic areas that approximate the land area covered by each ZIP code.
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ZCTA and we allowed for the union of the Census tracts in the intersection to extend over
the geographic area dened by any given ZCTA.
Except for the use of ZCTAs, we followed Haughwout et al.'s matching algorithm very
closely. The procedure entails 6 stages which use the originator's name, the loan amount,
and the origination dates to obtain the matches. The names are provided by the lenders
themselves in the HMDA data, but not in the LP data. As a result, lender names in LP
have to be cleaned manually before the matching. Loan amounts are provided in dollars in
LP, while they are provided in thousands in HMDA. Furthermore, HMDA allows lenders to
round up loan amounts to the nearest thousand if the fraction equals or exceeds $500. The
dates are matched to within 5 business days if the LP dates are not imputed or to the same
month if they are.3 A summary of the various stages is as follows:
 Stage 1 considers loans with matched originator names and uses the larger 4-digit
ZCTA search areas. Loan amounts are matched allowing a dierence of up to and
including $1,000.
 Stage 2 ignores originator names and uses 4-digit ZCTA search areas, as in stage 1.
 Stage 3 again considers originator names, but uses the smaller 5-digit ZCTA search
areas. Loan amounts are matched allowing a dierence of up to but not including
$1,000.
 Stage 4 is similar to stage 3 but ignores originator names.
 Stage 5 is similar to stage 1 but loan amounts are matched to within 2.5% of the LP
amount.
 Stage 6 is similar to stage 2 but loan amounts are matched to within 2.5% of the LP
amount.
3LP origination dates are considered to be imputed if they are exactly two months before the rst payment
date.
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At the conclusion of each stage, only one-to-matches are kept and are removed from the
data sets, while loans with multiple matches (either one LP loan to many HMDA loans,
or many LP loans to one HMDA loan) are thrown back into the matching pool for the
subsequent stages.
2.2 Summary statistics
Tables 1 through 6 contain summary statistics on the loans in our sample by race and
product type. Table 1 summarizes the counts of mortgages by product and race that were
matched. We consider three racial or ethnic categories: Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and
the remainder (non-Hispanic and non-blacks). We also consider the largest seven non-prime
mortgage categories (which account for about 90 percent of all non-prime loans) and we
included a category for the remainder. In addition to 2/28 adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs)
(with a xed interest rate for the rst two years and a variable rate for the remaining 28
years), we also consider 3/27 ARMs (with a xed rate for the rst three years and a variable
rate for the remaining 27 years), 10 year ARMs, 10 year xed rate mortgages (FRMs), 5
year ARMs, 30 year ARMs, and 30 year FRMs. As can be gleaned from the table, except
for 3/27 ARMs and 10 year ARMs, all other categories contain more loans than the 2/28
category.
We matched 283,180 purchase loans and 380,195 renances. Hispanic borrowers obtained
102,230 purchase loans, almost 5 times the amount for black borrowers, and they obtained
almost 98,000 renancing loans, about 3 times the amount for black borrowers. The most
popular products for home purchases across all race categories were 2/28 ARMs, 30 year
ARMs, and 5 year AMRs. For renances the most popular products also included 30 year
FRMs. For comparison, note that Haughwout et al. (2009) matched only 2/28 ARMs using
national data for August of 2005 for a total of about 75,000 loans.
Table 2 summarizes the proportion of loans by product and racial groups that (1) in-
cluded prepayment penalties (Prepay), (2) required purchase of private mortgage insurance
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(PMI), and (3) required full documentation (Full Doc). Unconditionally, black and Hispanic
borrowers face prepayment penalties more frequently than other borrowers in all product
categories. The exception is that black borrowers face prepayment penalties at about the
same frequency as other borrowers for 10 year FRM renances. Also, both black and His-
panic borrowers tend to be required to obtain private mortgage insurance more often than
other borrowers for most mortgage products. Finally, black borrowers are also required to
provide full documentation slightly more often than Hispanics and other borrowers.
As tables 3 and 4 indicate, black and Hispanic borrowers tend to have lower FICO scores
across most mortgage products (except that for 2/28s Hispanic borrowers show a slightly
higher FICO score than other borrowers). Black and Hispanic borrowers also tend to have
mortgages with higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, and higher debt-to-income (DTI) ratios.
The variable Good Credit summarizes these dierences; Good Credit takes a value of 1 if
the borrower has a FICO score above the 50th percentile, the LTV is at or below the 50th
percentile, and the DTI is at or below the 50th percentile. In summary, a smaller proportion
of black and Hispanic borrowers exhibit good credit when compared with other borrowers
both for purchases and for renances.
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the loan amounts and contract interest rates. They also
provide the average spread of the loan's annual percentage rate with a treasury security
of comparable maturity, as provided to HMDA. Loan amounts for blacks and Hispanics are
smaller than for other borrowers, and loan amounts for blacks are almost always smaller than
for Hispanics. Loan amounts for purchases tend to be higher than for renances. Contract
rates and spreads are slightly lower on renancing mortgages than on purchase mortgages.
Black and Hispanic borrowers generally face higher contract rates than other borrowers; the
dierence in the rates that black and Hispanic borrowers pay relative to other borrowers is
somewhat less pronounced in the spreads.
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Table 2: Prepayment Penalties, Private Mortgage Insurance, and Full Documentation
Purchases Renances
Product Race N Prepay PMI Full Doc N Prepay PMI Full Doc
10yr ARM Hispanic 6,987 0.482 0.051 0.139 2,373 0.456 0.039 0.241
black 1,042 0.427 0.076 0.243 602 0.445 0.055 0.287
other 18,437 0.350 0.068 0.232 9,961 0.344 0.026 0.308
Total 26,466 0.388 0.064 0.208 12,936 0.370 0.030 0.295
10yr FRM Hispanic 1,394 0.311 0.072 0.220 1,290 0.350 0.031 0.367
black 250 0.264 0.064 0.276 311 0.264 0.026 0.492
other 4,868 0.259 0.052 0.328 6,007 0.274 0.016 0.437
Total 6,512 0.271 0.056 0.303 7,608 0.286 0.019 0.427
2/28 Hispanic 10,029 0.945 0.094 0.352 4,231 0.972 0.129 0.507
black 1,468 0.928 0.095 0.471 1,144 0.956 0.121 0.603
other 10,070 0.906 0.098 0.405 7,170 0.949 0.125 0.587
Total 21,567 0.926 0.096 0.385 12,545 0.957 0.126 0.562
3/27 Hispanic 2,434 0.684 0.090 0.414 1,499 0.844 0.103 0.548
black 460 0.691 0.091 0.530 484 0.866 0.070 0.690
other 4,363 0.506 0.056 0.424 3,518 0.737 0.076 0.603
Total 7,257 0.578 0.069 0.427 5,501 0.777 0.083 0.596
30yr ARM Hispanic 34,702 0.901 0.179 0.317 46,830 0.934 0.193 0.394
black 9,356 0.920 0.209 0.446 17,707 0.946 0.217 0.520
other 56,625 0.813 0.143 0.323 119,000 0.895 0.190 0.449
Total 101,000 0.853 0.162 0.332 184,000 0.910 0.193 0.442
30yr FRM Hispanic 4,295 0.655 0.206 0.389 16,762 0.851 0.183 0.582
black 1,058 0.736 0.238 0.507 6,619 0.905 0.214 0.687
other 10,321 0.479 0.146 0.420 44,445 0.778 0.188 0.651
Total 15,674 0.545 0.168 0.417 67,826 0.808 0.189 0.637
5yr ARM Hispanic 29,542 0.896 0.152 0.383 13,349 0.910 0.210 0.489
black 4,934 0.879 0.129 0.521 3,985 0.913 0.194 0.607
other 41,464 0.795 0.112 0.475 29,629 0.840 0.198 0.585
Total 75,940 0.840 0.129 0.442 46,963 0.866 0.201 0.559
Other Hispanic 12,847 0.911 0.073 0.210 11,603 0.915 0.133 0.397
black 2,012 0.898 0.087 0.360 3,780 0.925 0.139 0.506
other 14,222 0.767 0.083 0.275 27,492 0.863 0.124 0.459
Total 29,081 0.840 0.079 0.252 42,875 0.883 0.128 0.446
Prepay, PMI, and Full Doc indicate the shares of mortgages in each category
with prepayment penalties, private mortgage insurance, and full documentation requirements.
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Table 3: Borrower's Credit Characteristics. Purchases
Good Credit FICO LTV DTI
Product Race N Share Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
10yr ARM Hispanic 6,987 0.460 715.6 47.8 79.6 5.3 25.3 18.8
black 1,042 0.430 709.8 44.0 80.0 5.7 26.5 18.5
other 18,437 0.480 722.3 46.1 79.2 7.1 25.8 18.1
Total 26,466 0.470 720.0 46.6 79.3 6.7 25.7 18.3
10yr FRM Hispanic 1,394 0.600 718.2 46.3 78.5 8.3 14.7 19.4
black 250 0.600 712.1 47.8 78.7 8.3 14.0 19.1
other 4,868 0.640 725.9 46.6 76.7 10.2 14.1 19.1
Total 6,512 0.630 723.7 46.7 77.1 9.8 14.2 19.2
2/28 Hispanic 10,029 0.170 668.6 45.7 81.3 4.7 32.8 18.5
black 1,468 0.140 655.9 45.5 82.4 5.8 32.3 18.6
other 10,070 0.160 665.0 47.8 81.4 4.9 32.6 18.7
Total 21,567 0.160 666.0 46.8 81.4 4.9 32.7 18.6
3/27 Hispanic 2,434 0.310 677.2 55.1 81.8 5.7 19.1 20.6
black 460 0.250 665.3 59.6 81.7 6.3 17.5 20.5
other 4,363 0.370 686.6 58.7 80.9 6.2 17.9 20.3
Total 7,257 0.340 682.1 57.9 81.2 6.0 18.3 20.4
30yr ARM Hispanic 34,702 0.200 657.9 58.8 82.1 7.4 27.8 20.3
black 9,356 0.130 635.3 59.4 84.0 7.8 28.1 20.3
other 56,625 0.320 670.3 67.3 80.7 8.5 24.0 20.5
Total 100,683 0.260 662.8 64.6 81.5 8.2 25.7 20.5
30yr FRM Hispanic 4,295 0.350 683.7 60.2 78.9 12.5 21.1 21.1
black 1,058 0.250 661.1 68.3 80.5 12.1 22.8 21.4
other 10,321 0.470 696.1 66.0 76.6 13.9 16.7 20.3
Total 15,674 0.420 690.4 65.3 77.5 13.5 18.3 20.7
5yr ARM Hispanic 29,542 0.200 676.3 47.9 80.9 4.7 34.0 18.3
black 4,934 0.160 662.0 49.1 81.5 5.4 34.5 18.6
other 41,464 0.230 678.0 51.7 80.6 5.6 32.6 19.1
Total 75,940 0.210 676.3 50.2 80.8 5.3 33.3 18.8
Other Hispanic 12,847 0.190 665.3 51.6 80.5 5.0 32.4 19.3
black 2,012 0.150 648.2 53.5 81.3 5.9 32.2 19.6
other 14,222 0.300 679.6 61.7 79.7 7.3 28.4 19.8
Total 29,081 0.240 671.2 57.6 80.2 6.3 30.4 19.7
The variable Good Credit takes a value of 1 if the borrower has a FICO score
above the 50th percentile, Loan-to-Value ratio at or below the 50th percentile,
and Debt-to-Income ratio at or below the 50th percentile.
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Table 4: Borrower's Credit Characteristics. Renances
Good Credit FICO LTV DTI
Product Race N Share Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
10yr ARM Hispanic 2,373 0.460 697.4 45.9 71.4 12.3 24.4 18.8
black 602 0.410 695.2 49.0 72.8 11.9 25.4 18.7
other 9,961 0.540 710.6 47.5 69.5 13.3 24.7 17.9
Total 12,936 0.520 707.5 47.6 70.0 13.1 24.7 18.1
10yr FRM Hispanic 1,290 0.590 700.1 48.4 65.7 14.6 13.9 18.8
black 311 0.630 705.0 49.4 66.4 14.6 12.9 18.8
other 6,007 0.680 715.5 50.2 64.5 15.5 13.1 18.3
Total 7,608 0.660 712.5 50.2 64.8 15.3 13.3 18.4
2/28 Hispanic 4,231 0.070 640.1 43.2 80.8 11.4 32.6 17.7
black 1,144 0.050 627.9 38.3 80.5 11.8 32.0 18.2
other 7,170 0.060 632.6 41.7 80.6 11.6 31.1 18.7
Total 12,545 0.060 634.7 42.1 80.7 11.5 31.7 18.4
3/27 Hispanic 1,499 0.180 644.6 51.5 77.2 12.4 17.9 20.4
black 484 0.140 635.3 51.3 78.3 12.3 19.1 20.4
other 3,518 0.220 646.9 56.6 76.8 12.4 15.5 19.9
Total 5,501 0.200 645.2 54.9 77.0 12.4 16.5 20.1
30yr ARM Hispanic 46,830 0.160 615.4 70.3 73.8 13.3 27.5 19.9
black 17,707 0.090 594.9 64.4 75.5 12.9 28.8 19.9
other 119,404 0.230 627.1 77.4 73.2 13.6 24.9 20.1
Total 183,941 0.200 621.0 75.2 73.6 13.5 25.9 20.1
30yr FRM Hispanic 16,762 0.210 641.0 62.7 67.2 15.9 23.4 21.1
black 6,619 0.140 620.3 62.8 70.3 15.9 24.8 20.9
other 44,445 0.260 647.8 68.5 68.6 16.4 21.6 20.7
Total 67,826 0.240 643.4 67.0 68.4 16.3 22.3 20.9
5yr ARM Hispanic 13,349 0.110 647.0 48.1 78.7 11.9 32.9 17.8
black 3,985 0.090 638.1 45.0 79.7 11.5 32.5 18.2
other 29,629 0.150 650.0 50.9 78.0 12.4 31.4 18.6
Total 46,963 0.130 648.2 49.8 78.4 12.2 31.9 18.4
Other Hispanic 11,603 0.190 635.4 65.3 71.6 15.6 29.2 19.3
black 3,780 0.150 621.6 64.0 73.1 15.0 30.2 19.2
other 27,492 0.290 652.8 73.0 70.9 15.8 27.5 19.0
Total 42,875 0.250 645.3 71.0 71.3 15.7 28.2 19.1
The variable Good Credit takes a value of 1 if the borrower has a FICO score
above the 50th percentile, Loan-to-Value ratio at or below the 50th percentile,
and Debt-to-Income ratio at or below the 50th percentile.
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Table 5: Loan Amount and Contract Rate. Purchases
Loan Amount Contract Rate HMDA Spread
Product Race N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
10yr ARM Hispanic 6,987 351,587 157,989 6.17 0.64 4.61 0.87
black 1,042 344,020 179,952 6.18 0.69 4.58 0.83
other 18,437 415,350 242,788 6.01 0.65 4.55 1.02
Total 26,466 395,708 223,189 6.06 0.65 4.57 0.94
10yr FRM Hispanic 1,394 330,075 167,893 6.44 0.58 4.63 0.90
black 250 329,845 180,702 6.51 0.60 4.41 1.03
other 4,868 385,144 234,578 6.29 0.50 4.46 1.26
Total 6,512 371,232 221,327 6.33 0.53 4.52 1.12
2/28 Hispanic 10,029 314,674 119,294 6.76 0.71 4.45 0.66
black 1,468 299,742 130,789 6.85 0.80 4.49 0.79
other 10,070 334,131 134,197 6.78 0.78 4.45 0.73
Total 21,567 322,742 127,734 6.78 0.75 4.45 0.70
3/27 Hispanic 2,434 302,841 123,809 6.50 0.85 4.46 0.80
black 460 283,932 150,799 6.66 0.90 4.61 0.81
other 4,363 354,771 177,342 6.33 0.94 4.48 0.92
Total 7,257 332,864 161,949 6.41 0.91 4.48 0.86
30yr ARM Hispanic 34,702 279,095 164,854 6.59 1.82 4.71 0.89
black 9,356 236,245 161,569 7.19 1.55 4.96 0.94
other 56,625 369,974 270,337 6.06 2.20 4.79 0.99
Total 100,683 326,225 235,560 6.35 2.05 4.78 0.94
30yr FRM Hispanic 4,295 252,306 147,372 6.77 0.85 4.22 0.93
black 1,058 207,940 165,064 7.21 1.10 4.33 1.06
other 10,321 295,783 218,720 6.60 0.87 4.21 0.98
Total 15,674 277,940 200,020 6.69 0.90 4.23 0.98
5yr ARM Hispanic 29,542 320,809 132,203 6.63 0.76 4.54 0.78
black 4,934 305,553 154,185 6.72 0.83 4.58 0.83
other 41,464 351,149 176,499 6.49 0.80 4.44 0.84
Total 75,940 336,383 160,086 6.56 0.79 4.49 0.82
Other Hispanic 12,847 331,221 143,487 6.93 1.06 4.67 0.85
black 2,012 316,266 163,512 7.16 1.12 4.85 0.92
other 14,222 402,025 221,213 6.55 1.51 4.74 0.93
Total 29,081 364,813 190,298 6.76 1.32 4.71 0.89
HMDA spread denotes the spread between the APR and the yield on a treasury
security of comparable maturity if the loan is a high cost loan, dened as one
for which the spread is 300 basis points or more.
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Table 6: Loan Amount and Contract Rate. Renances
Loan Amount Contract Rate HMDA Spread
Product Race N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
10yr ARM Hispanic 2,373 366,210 197,168 6.04 0.66 4.60 0.96
black 602 375,569 228,459 6.10 0.77 4.65 1.00
other 9,961 478,403 300,767 5.86 0.75 4.61 1.02
Total 12,936 453,036 285,249 5.90 0.74 4.61 1.00
10yr FRM Hispanic 1,290 319,933 170,739 6.19 0.46 4.69 1.01
black 311 319,736 174,209 6.21 0.46 4.88 1.02
other 6,007 394,420 253,192 6.12 0.43 4.64 1.13
Total 7,608 378,737 240,237 6.14 0.44 4.68 1.08
2/28 Hispanic 4,231 318,713 118,398 6.64 0.73 4.49 0.72
black 1,144 315,450 126,163 6.68 0.78 4.49 0.82
other 7,170 346,710 145,610 6.67 0.77 4.43 0.80
Total 12,545 334,417 136,004 6.66 0.76 4.46 0.78
3/27 Hispanic 1,499 302,973 119,981 6.36 0.79 4.43 0.77
black 484 292,605 139,361 6.40 0.79 4.49 0.83
other 3,518 349,173 179,558 6.30 0.86 4.38 0.82
Total 5,501 331,607 163,700 6.33 0.83 4.41 0.81
30yr ARM Hispanic 46,830 271,409 144,078 6.55 2.05 4.87 1.00
black 17,707 236,664 142,976 7.07 1.88 5.11 1.10
other 119,404 328,301 235,372 6.34 2.25 5.02 1.25
Total 183,941 304,996 210,486 6.46 2.17 4.99 1.17
30yr FRM Hispanic 16,762 230,994 118,860 6.65 0.83 4.43 1.07
black 6,619 194,692 118,838 7.03 1.02 4.44 1.15
other 44,445 255,551 173,818 6.69 0.95 4.41 1.21
Total 67,826 243,543 158,218 6.72 0.94 4.42 1.16
5yr ARM Hispanic 13,349 320,576 127,922 6.60 0.77 4.58 0.83
black 3,985 320,525 137,162 6.66 0.80 4.62 0.89
other 29,629 361,895 180,343 6.53 0.82 4.50 0.88
Total 46,963 346,640 164,815 6.56 0.80 4.54 0.87
Other Hispanic 11,603 292,548 146,004 6.65 1.52 4.91 1.00
black 3,780 279,258 156,582 6.88 1.52 5.04 2.13
other 27,492 349,599 227,808 6.41 1.77 4.90 1.16
Total 42,875 327,958 205,072 6.52 1.69 4.92 1.27
HMDA spread denotes the spread between the APR and the yield on a treasury
security of comparable maturity if the loan is a high cost loan, dened as one
for which the spread is 300 basis points or more.
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3 A Model of Mortgage Rate Determination
In this section, we present a simple reduced-form model of mortgage rate determination which
is derived from a test proposed in Ross and Yinger (2002, ch. 10). In the model, lenders
charge a rate based on the expected performance of the loan. Loan performance is judged
by the expected probability that it produces adverse outcomes|e.g., default or prepayment.
Along the lines of Ladd (1998), who discusses various denitions of mortgage discrimination
in light of the relevant mortgage laws, we allow for the possibility that lenders may vary the
rate charged based on variables used to identify two broad classes of discrimination: disparate
treatment and disparate impact. The former is manifest in rate changes directly associated
with race variables. The latter occurs when policies that do not explicitly take race into
account result in disparities among racial groups because race is correlated with other non-
race variables that may be used in underwriting, even when they are not necessarily good
predictors of loan performance. To this end, we allow loan performance to vary with race
and other variables.
The advantage of this approach is that it enables us to detect both disparate impact
and disparate treatment discrimination, both of which are illegal. In particular, if lenders
wish to discriminate against a particular group, either because of taste-based discrimination
(manifested in a direct eect of race and ethnicity on interest rates independent of the
eect via loan performance) or because of statistical discrimination (manifested through
the eect on predicted loan performance), lenders may change the weights of various loan
characteristics in a pricing model to indirectly discriminate against minorities. Furthermore,
by including Census tract characteristics, namely median family income and percent of
minority population, we can also detect redlining.
The test proceeds as follows:
1. We draw a sample of loans for a particular mortgage product and estimate loan per-
formance models (using default and prepayment as the adverse outcomes) using loan,
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individual, and Census tract characteristics including the minority status of the bor-
rower, the income of the Census tract, and the racial composition of the Census tract.
We label this the actuarial stage.
2. We then draw a new sample of loans, and using the estimation outcomes from stage
1, we compute the predicted performance of the new sample of loans using loan and
individual characteristics. In this step, we omit the minority status of the borrower,
the Census tract income, and the racial composition of the Census tract.
3. Finally, we estimate a model with the loans from stage 2 using the actual interest rate
as the dependent variable and the predicted probabilities of default and prepayment.
We label this the underwriting stage.
3.1 Empirical Framework
To formalize, consider the following linear rate setting equation:
Rn = 0 + pb Pn + zzn + xxn + en; (1)
where Rn is the rate charged for loan n, b Pn is a (  1) vector of measures of loan perfor-
mance, zn is a (z  1) vector of impact variables (non-race variables), and en  N (0;2).
The (x  1) vector of treatment variables xn includes a set of individual discrimination
indicators (i.e., borrower race) and a set of redlining indicators (e.g., neighborhood racial
composition).
In order to estimate (1), we require the vector of predicted loan performance measures,
b Pn. Loan performance data typically consists of binary measures|i.e., does the loan default
or gets prepaid within two years |which would not be available at the time the rate is
set. Instead, we use the vector of expected loan performance, which is composed of the
forecasted probability of loan default and the forecasted probability of prepayment. To
construct these, we extract from the full sample of loans a subset of loans to use as an
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actuarial sample. From this sample, we estimate models of loan performance and use the
resulting estimation to construct predicted performance for loans in a dierent underwriting
sample on which we evaluate the presence of discrimination.
We partition the full set of loans into an M loan actuarial sample and an N loan under-
writing sample. Let Pm represent the vector of  dierent performance measures for loan m
from the actuarial sample. Let qm represent the (q  1) vector of non-racial characteristics
which aect loan performance (e.g., FICO score, loan-to-value ratio, etcetera), and let wm
represent the (w  1) vector of racial characteristics (black and Hispanic indicators) which
may aect loan performance. For any m, the probability that Pim = 1| e.g., that loan m
defaults|can be specied as a probit:
Pr[Pim = 1] = (i0 + iqqm + iwwm); (2)
where the link function, (:), is the standard normal cdf and i = [i0;iq;iw] are slope
coecients specic to the ith performance measure. From (2), the predicted probabilities
for loans from the underwriting subsample are computed as
b Pin = (i0 + iqqn); (3)
where, again, (:) is the standard normal cdf. Note that the vector of race variables, wm,
are excluded from the calculation of the predicted loan performance measures. The use of
these variables as predictors of loan performance are illegal; however, we must extract out
their eect in the loan performance model in order to properly assess the eect of other
measures.4
4We discuss below under what circumstances these treatment variables might be used in the predicted
probabilities.
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3.2 Identifying Types of Discrimination
As indicated above, we broadly classied three forms of discrimination: disparate treatment,
disparate impact, and redlining. Disparate treatment discrimination will increase the rate
charged to a minority borrower; redlining will increase the rate charged to individuals in a
minority neighborhood. We dierentiate disparate treatment discrimination from redlining
by partitioning the treatment variable, xn, in the rate equation into individual and neigh-
borhood subvectors, xind
n and xarea
n , respectively. An increase in the rate attributable to
elements of xind
n reects disparate treatment discrimination while an increase in the rate at-
tributable to elements of xarea
n reects redlining. The use of variables that do not explicitly
take race into account (included in the vector zn) and are not necessarily good predictors of
performance might result in disparate impact on certain racial groups. We allow for the in-
teractions of race and ethnicity indicators with impact variables to be included in the vector
xn.
Discrimination may result from tasted-based discrimination (animosity or prejudice against
minorities) or from statistical discrimination (the lender uses race or ethnicity to estimate the
borrower's credit worthiness). To dierentiate the two forms, the predicted loan performance
used in underwriting (3) is rewritten to include the treatment variable, wm. In this case,
discrimination causes a change in the loan's predicted performance through a dierence in
the probability of, say, default. To capture this, we can compute the predicted performance
when race is included:
e Pin = (i0 + iqqn + iwwm): (4)
and dene the dierence as b Pin = e Pin   b Pin. We can modify the rate equation to account
for the change in expected loan performance:
Rn = 0 + pb Pn + pb Pn + zzn + xxn + en; (5)
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where it is important to note that, because of the nonlinearity in (:) we have placed a
restriction on p to be constant across the b Pn and b Pn. Statistical discrimination, then, is
indicated if the term pb Pn is nonzero.
3.3 Evaluating Discrimination
Standard (classical) tests for discrimination might examine the statistical signicance of the
coecients on the xn's and perform a model comparison between (1) and (5). We will opt
for a Bayesian environment in which we can assess the probability that discrimination is
present in the sample. To accomplish this, we augment the rate equation with two vectors
of model indicator dummies,  and :
Rn = 0 + p

b Pn + (1   ) e Pn

+ zzn +   xxn + en;
where  denotes the Hadamard product. The model indicators  and  are vectors of
zeros and ones with dimensions (x  1) and (  1), respectively. Individual elements of 
will determine the extent of disparate treatment, disparate impact, or redlining in the rate.
Because we restrict p to be the same in both the b Pn and e Pn terms,  can be thought of as
a model selection variable that determines the presence of statistical discrimination.
3.4 Estimation
The rate equation (1), utilizes predicted performance and, therefore, suers from a gener-
ated regressor problem (see Pagan, 1984). In a classical environment, one could estimate
the probit model using, say, maximum likelihood and employ a bootstrap to estimate the
standard errors (see Kilian, 1998). Instead, we opt to estimate the model in a Bayesian envi-
ronment. We employ a set of relatively uninformative standard priors. The slope coecients
in both the rate equation and in the probit have mean zero normal priors; the variance of
the innovations in the rate equation has an inverse Gamma prior. The priors for each of the
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model indicators are at.
The posteriors used for inference are generated from the Gibbs sampler using two Metropolis-
in-Gibbs steps. The Gibbs sampler is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo technique which iter-
atively draws each parameter from its conditional distribution. The collection of draws
converges to the full set of parameters' joint posterior. Inference is performed on a subset of
draws, some of which are discarded to allow for convergence.
Our algorithm is a three step procedure. In the rst step, we draw the slope parameters
of the probit. After allowing for convergence, for each draw of , we compute two predicted
performance measures, b Pn and e Pn, conditional on the draw of . For each b Pn and e Pn
combination, we then iteratively draw 1000 samples of , , and , burning the rst 500 to
account for convergence. The rst step is repeated 500 times after convergence is achieved.
We store , , and  draws every 10 draws, which yields 500 draws of  and 25,000 draws
of , , and , which are pooled. Note that the sampling algorithm described here accounts
for the sampling uncertainty in  which would create the generated regressor problem in b Pn
and e Pn. The nal result is a set of posterior distributions for  and  and a set of model
inclusion probabilities for each of the b Pn's and xn's.
Details of the sampling methods, including the specications for the priors and the pos-
terior draws, are included in the attached appendix.
4 Results
To implement the evaluation discussed in the previous section, we randomly divide the
sample for each mortgage product in half. We use the rst half to form the actuarial sample
and estimate the probit model for two measures of loan performance: default within 2 years
and prepayment within 2 years of closing.5
5We consider a loan in default if the LP variable MBA STAT takes a value of 9, F, or R. We consider
a loan prepaid if the loan leaves the database or has an MBA STAT of 0 in a particular month and the
MBA STAT variable does not take a value of 6, 9, F, or R in the month before the loan leaves the database.
To keep our model parsimonious, we do not construct loan performance measures for other horizons; see
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For now we set  = 1 and leave the analysis of dierentiating taste-based from statistical
discrimination for future versions of this paper and we focus on the problem of identifying
disparate treatment, disparate impact, and redlining.
Tables 7 and 8 present the results from the loan performance models using the actuarial
sample. Table 7 present the results for the default measure, and table 8 presents the results
for the prepayment measure. The tables present the medians of the posterior distributions of
the coecients. We indicate with an asterisk that 0 is not contained inside the corresponding
90 percent coverage interval. The results from the loan performance models indicate that
standard measures of credit worthiness, such as FICO scores, loan-to-value ratios, and debt-
to-income ratios are important determinants of both default and prepayment. Renances
are associated with lower default and higher prepayment. 30 year FRMs, 30 year ARMs,
and 10 year FRMs are more likely to default in Florida than in California, while most
mortgage products are less likely to be prepaid in Florida than in California. Loans for blacks
and Hispanics are more likely to default in four of the eight mortgage product categories.
Prepayment penalties on black and Hispanics appear to be associated with lower default
rates, but seem to have a positive impact on the probability of prepayment for 2/28 ARMs
and no apparent eect on other mortgage products. Higher tract income and higher share
of tract minority population are associated with both lower default probability and higher
prepayment probability.
Table 9 presents the estimation results in the underwriting sample. As before, the coe-
cients represent the medians of the posterior distribution and the asterisk indicates that 0 is
not contained in the 90 percent coverage interval. However, the coecients associated with
the treatment variables x represent the medians of the posterior distributions, conditional
on the mode of the corresponding inclusion variable , for cases in which the variable inclu-
sion probability (the probability that the corresponding value of  is equal to 1) exceeds 80
percent.
Demyanyk (2009) for evidence on the large proportion of subprime loans that terminate within two or three
years of origination.
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The results from table 9 indicate that both measures of forecasted performance have a
positive impact on rate determination. Prepayment penalties and private mortgage insurance
requirements also increase rates in about half of the mortgage product categories. Higher
loan amounts reduce interest rates, and loans in Florida exhibit higher interest rates than in
California.
As in Haughwout et al. (2009) we nd no evidence of discrimination in 2/28 ARMs.
However, lower-income neighborhoods face higher interest rates for this mortgage product,
which suggests redlining. Disparate treatment discrimination does appear to be present in
other mortgage products. Specically, race indicators are associated with higher interest
rates in 30 year ARMs, 10 year FRMs, 10 year ARMs, 5 year ARMs, and in the remainder
category. The Hispanic indicator has a positive impact on all of these categories, while
the black indicator has a positive eect only on 30 year ARMs, 5 year ARMs, and in the
remainder category. Hispanics appear to face prepayment penalties as a requirement for
obtaining lower interest rates in 5 year ARMs and in the remainder category. The interaction
of the indicator for blacks and prepayment penalties has a positive eect on rates in 10
year ARMs and a negative eect in the remainder category. Purchase of private mortgage
insurance among black and Hispanics also lowers interest rates in 30 year FRMs.
Redlining, as indicated from lower tract income associated with higher interest rates,
appears to be present not only in 2/28s, but also in 30 year FRMs, 30 year ARMs, 10 year
FRMs, 5 year ARMs, and the remainder category. Furthermore, a higher share of minorities
also leads to higher interest rates in 10 year ARMs and in 5 year ARMs.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we examined the eect of race and ethnicity on the pricing of subprime mort-
gages in California and Florida during 2005. We estimated a reduced-form model of mortgage
rate determination in which the lender takes into account the predicted loan performance
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when making the rate-setting decision. We assessed the eect of race and ethnicity, as well
as the eect of neighborhood characteristics, both in the loan performance evaluation and
in the lender's rate decision.
In contrast with previous studies of the subprime market we nd evidence of adverse
pricing for black and Hispanic borrowers in many of the mortgage products we considered.
These eects are substantial and lead to rate increases ranging from 5 to 35 basis points. We
also nd an adverse pricing eect in lower income neighborhoods. Finally, we nd that for
minorities, the purchase of private mortgage insurance and prepayment penalty fees seem to
be associated with obtaining lower interest rates.
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A Estimation Details
This appendix describes the Bayesian methods used to estimate the model in Section 3. The
model is estimated with an iterative technique { the Gibbs sampler { which requires a prior.
For the slope parameters in both (5) and (2), we assume a normal prior. The innovation
variance of the rate equation has an inverse Gamma prior. Each of the model indicators has
a at prior. The hyper-parameters for the prior distributions are shown in table 10.
Estimation of the parameters of (2) can be accomplished by data augmentation (Tanner
and Wong, 1987). Dene a latent variable yim which has mean i0 + iqqm + iwwm,
unit variance, and is restricted such that yim > 0 i Pim = 1. Then, conditional on i,
yi = fyimg
M
m=1 can be drawn independently from truncated normal distributions. Let q =
(q1;:::;qM)
0 and w = (w1;:::;wM)
0. Then, conditional on the drawn yim, we draw i from a
normal posterior:
ijyi  N (ai;Ai);
25Preliminary Not for distribution
Table 10: Priors for Estimation
Parameter Prior Distribution Hyperparameters
i N (a0;A0) a0 = 01+q+w ; A0= I1+q+w
 p N (b0;B0) b0 = 01+x+z ; B0 = I1+x+z



















0 m0 + X0
iyi

, and yi = (yi1;:::;yiM)
0, and Xi =
(1M;q;w). After a suitable number of draws are discarded to obtain convergence, we utilize
the draws of the i to generate predictions for performance of the N loans to be used for
underwriting. For each draw, we compute b Pn and e Pn from (3) and (4), respectively.
For each (post convergence) draw of b Pn, we sample 1000 draws from the posterior distri-
butions of the model parameters  p, p, , , and 2. Conditional on  and 2, the model
inclusion parameters, , and the vector of slopes (excluding p),  p, can be drawn jointly
from a reversible jump Metropolis Hastings in Gibbs step (see Troughton and Godsill, 1997,












which means we draw the candidate  rst and then, conditional on , we draw 
 p. The
candidate  is generated by drawing a random index from a discrete uniform distribution.
The element corresponding to the drawn index is switched { one to zero, zero to one. Then,
conditional on , the prior for  p is
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0 are the hyperparameters corresponding to the candidate covariate set. The
candidate  is drawn from
















6Turning elements of the indicator  on and o changes the model dimension. The resulting variation in
the model dimension across Gibbs iterations makes joint sampling more ecient.
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where (:) is the multivariate normal pdf and the unstarred b, B, and B0 correspond to the
hyperparameters computed conditional on the last (accepted) iteration of .
Next, we draw the joint pair (;p) by again selecting a candidate  and drawing 
p
from a normal proposal, conditional on . The proposals for  and p { as well as the
acceptance probability { have forms similar to those expressed above. For brevity, we omit
the formalities.
The nal step in the Gibbs loop is the draw of 2 conditional on  p, p, , , and












where e = R  and  =

1N;b PN   (1   ) e PN;z0
N;x0
N
0
.
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